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Case No. 8042 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
.of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY ALEXANDER, RALPH H. 
ALEXANDER and EVELYN ALEX-
ANDER. HOWICK, 
Plaintiffs a.nd Respondents, 
-vs.-
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant, 
and 
HANNAH WILSON ALEXANDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF: 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Co1tnsel for Respondents 
530 J'udge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY _A_LEX_._\~DER, RALPH H. 
ALEXANDER and E·r-EL YN ALEX-
ANDER. HO\YICK, 
Pla-intiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST Case- No. 8042 
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant, 
and 
HANNAH WILSON ALEXANDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION F·OR REHEARING AND BRIEF· 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF: 
PETITION F'OR REHEARING 
COME now HARRY ALEXANDER, RALPH H. 
ALEXANDER and EVELYN ALEXANDER H·OW-
ICK, respondents herein, an;d respectfully petition this 
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Honorable c·ourt for a rehearing in the a~bove-entitled 
case and to vacate the Order of this Court herein revers-
ing the judgment entered thereon by the trial court. 
This petition is based upon the following grounds: 
POIN·T I. 
The conclusion of this Court that the word "ve1st", 
as used in a typical spendthrift trust clause conclusively 
establishes that a trust agreement is testamentary is a 
proposition that has at no time been raised or argued by 
appellant either at the trial or on this appeal; there-
fore, the dictates of justice and respect for the trial eourt 
would seem to require that respondents be given the right 
to argue and submit authorities ·as to whether the spend-
thrift trust clause and particularly the word "ve·st" should 
be accorded the remarkable significance given it by this 
court in its op·inion. 
POINT· II. 
This Court 'Should reconsider a decision which has 
defeated the intent of the settlor by an utter disregard of 
the clear purport of the trust instrument. Paragraph 
5 of said instrument refers to "* * *interests * * * created 
hereby * * * ." Yet this Court has declared that the settlor 
did not intend to create an interest thereby, ·and 'for that 
reason alone has defeated the trust agreement. 
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POINT III. 
This Court has erroneously decided tha,t the trust in-
strunlent must fail because the interest of the benefici-
aries did not immediately vest in possession. The test 
this Court should have applied in determining validity 
of the trust agreen1ent is whether or not said agreement 
bona fidely transferred a property interest from trustor 
to trustee. 
Accompanying this Petition and filed herewith is a 
Brief in support hereof. 
JOHN L. BLACK, 
Attorney for Respondernts 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CERTIFICA·TE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that I am the attorney for the re-
spondents, petitioners herein, and that in my opinion 
there is good cause to believe the judgment oibjected to is 
erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined as 
prayed for in said Petition. 
DATED this ------------ day of September, 19·54. 
JOHN L. BLACK 
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RECEIVE:Q a copy of the foregoing Petition and 
Brief in support thereof this ····-------- day of September, 
1954. 
GRANT' H. BAGLEY 
D. EUGENE LIVINGS·TON 
DAVID E. SALISBURY 
Attorneys for Defendant a;nd 
Appellant 
BRIEF IN ·sUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE CONCLUSION OF THIS COURT THAT THE WORD 
"VEST", AS USED IN A TYPICAL SPENDTHRIFT TRUST 
CLAUSE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT A TRUST 
AGREEMENT IS TESTAMENTARY IS A PROPOSITION 
THAT HAS AT NO TIME BEEN RAISED OR ARGUED BY 
APPELLANT EITHER AT THE TRIAL OR ON THIS AP-
PEAL; THEREFORE, THE DI·CTATES OF JUSTICE AND 
RESPECT FOR THE TRIAL COURT WOULD SEEM TO RE-
QUIRE THAT RESPONDENTS BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO 
ARGUE AND SUBMIT AUTHORITIES AS TO WHETHER 
THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST CLAUSE AND PARTICULARLY 
THE WORD "VEST" SHOULD BE ACCORDED THE RE-
MARKABLE SIGNIFICANCE GIVEN IT BY THIS COURT 
IN ITS OPINION. 
It ·can be ascertained from reading the Brief of Appel-
lant that no contention was made that the trust in ques-
tion was invalid for the reason stated in the opinion filed, 
i.e., that the· spendthrift trust clause 'showed a sp,ecific 
intent that no Tight should vest in plaintiffs, at least until 
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5 
the death of the surviving settlor. Inasmuch as this point 
\vas not urged in appellant's brief, respondents did not 
have the op·portunity to meet such contention either by 
brief or by oral argument. 
In the case of People ex rel. Park R.eservoir Co. v. 
Hinderlider et a.l., 98 Colo. 505, 57 P. 2d 894, the Sup·reme 
Court of Colorado reversed a judgment for reasons not 
assigned in any of the briefs or oral arguments of coun-
sel. On Petition for Rehearing the Court held that de-
fendants in error 'vere entitled to a rehearing to ~argue 
the points on which the decision was :based. The fore-
going case is representative of the great weight of au-
thority. 
It is particularly fitting that respondents should he 
granted a rehearing in this case where the brusis of thi'S 
Court's opinion is unique in the field of trust law, and 
has the effect of making questionable spendthrift clauses 
in common use in most of the banking institutions of this 
state and by the legal profession generally. 
P·OINT II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD RE~CONSIDER A DECISION 
WHICH HAS DEFEATED THE INTENT OF THE SETTLOR 
BY AN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE CLEAR PURPORT 
OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT. PARAGRAPH 5 OF SAID 
INSTRUMENT REFERS TO "* -x- * INTERESTS * * * CRE-
ATED HEREBY***." YET THIS COURT HAS DECLARED 
THAT THE SETTLOR DID NOT INTEND TO CREATE AN 
INTEREST THEREBY, AND FOR THAT REASON ALONE 
HAS DEFEATED THE TRUST AGREEMENT. 
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It can be seen from reading the Trust Agreement 
that according 'to the general scheme the trustors first 
described the trust fund and aS'signed and transferred it 
to the trustee; next, expressed the reservation of the 
rights of revocation and amendment and of changing 
beneficiaries; next, de~scribed how the residue and re-
Inainder of said trust fund should be distr:i:buted upon the 
death of the survivor in specifically designated shares to 
specifically design·ated beneficiaries; next, specified the 
po,vers of the trustee, and then included paragraph 5. 
By reading over paragraph 5 of the Trust Agreement it 
can easily be seen that thrs is a paragraph which is com-
nlonly called a "spendthrift trust" clause. Spendthrift 
trust clauses are ordinarily used for the purpose of pro~ 
tecting beneficiaries from creditors and also from the-ir 
own tendency to anticipate any of the benefits before 
they are entitled to receive them. This paragraph was 
seized on by the court to invalidate the entire Trust 
Agreement as testamentary merely because the statement 
was made that "The respective interests of beneficiaries 
in the Trust Fund created hereby shall in no case vest in 
such beneficiaries until they, respectively, shall become 
entitled to receive and demand, absolutely and forthwith, 
the income or principal of the said Trust Fund to which 
they, respectively, may be entitled hereunder." Even at 
the beginning of the paragraph the trustors lra.ve spoken 
of the "respective interest'S of beneficiaries in the Trust 
Fund created hereby" and later on in the same paragraph 
it is. stated, "* * * the interests of said beneficiar·ies, and 
each of them, either in the principal or the: income 'Shall 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
not be liable in any 1nanner or to any extent for the obli-
gations or liabilities, voluntary or involuntary, of the 
said beneficiaries, or either or any of them, of whatsoever 
character." 
It is certainly an anomalous situation when the 
trustors haYe been so careful and meticulous about draw-
ing up a Trust Agreement and specifying the benefici-
aries and the respective shares of said beneficiaries in the 
trust fund and then added a clause for the express p·ur-
pose of protecting said beneficiaries, to have the court 
hold that such clause indicates that the trustors intende·d 
that said beneficiaries have nothing more than a mere 
expectancy at the time of the creation of the trust. F'ur-
thermore, the wording, even in the spendthrift trust 
clause, specifically recognizes that said beneficiaries 
have an interest. It is respectfully submitted that the 
purpose of the spendthrift trust clause is to p·rotect the 
interests of the beneficiaries and not to provide that 
said beneficiaries have no interest other than a mere ex-
p·ectancy. It is well known law that an expectancy is not 
assignable. See Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 86.1, where 
it is stated: 
"* * * It does not follow, however, that the 
expectant heir or legatee has before the death of 
the aneestor or testator such a property interest 
as can be presently assigned by him or made the 
subject of a trust." 
If the settlors me·ant to give the beneficiaries nothing 
more than a mere expectancy, it is indeed strange that 
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they ~hould then attempt to make this expectancy non-
assignable when an expectancy is not assignable anyway .. 
li"urthermore, it is strange that they should attempt to 
place thi~s expectancy in a trust when an expectancy can-
not be 1nade the subject of a trust. 
Furthermore, in paragraph 3 of the Trust Agree-
Inent special provisions are made for the handling of the 
trust property after the death of the survivor of the 
trustors in case one or more of the two grandchildren are 
still under legal age. It is provided that if such is the 
case, the trustee, if it deems advisable, shall use its busi-
ness discretion and provide proper care, support, main-
tenance and education for the minor grandchildren prior 
to said grandchildren coming of legal age, and it is fur-
ther stated: 
"* * * In the event that either of said two 
grandchildren shall die before receiving the full 
portion of the Trust Fund to which he or she is 
entitled hereunder, the share of such deceased 
grandchild shall go to the surviving grandchild, 
if there be a survivor, and if not, then such share 
shall go to Harry Alexander, son of Trustor, or 
his then living heirs." 
According to the language relied on by the court in 
paragraph 5, the respective interests in the beneficiaries 
shall in no case vest until said beneficiaries, respectively, 
shall ·become entitled to receive ·and demand absolutely 
and forthwith the income or principal of the said trust 
fund. It is ~submitted that according to the Trust Agree-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1nent in case either one of the grandchildren are under 
age at the thne of the death of the surviving trustor, 
that since the trustee is given discretion of whether or 
not to p·ay from their respective shares any money for his 
or her support, n1aintenance, care or education, that at 
that ti1ne said beneficiaries cannot absolutely demand any 
income or principal fro1n the trust fund. Yet, para-
graph 3 speaks of the trustee paying from the "respective 
shares" of the beneficiaries and a.ltso speaks of what 
should happen to said respective shares in case either 
of the two grandchildren shall die before reeeiving the 
full portion of the trust fund. This clearly indicates that 
the trustors recognized an immediate interest in the 
beneficiaries and certainly not a mere expectancy, a.s set 
forth by the court in its opinion. 
In speaking of a similar type p-roblem in determining 
vest'ing under the rule against perpetuities, it is stated in 
Spendthrift Trusts1 2nd Edition, by Erwin N. Griswold, 
p·a.r. 280.1: 
"There are some decisions to the effect that 
a spendthrift trust clause operates to keep the 
estate from vesting, and thus makes it invalid 
under the rule against perpetuities when it would 
otherwise be valid. ·There seems to he no ba:sis 
on which such a 'Conclusion can be supported. 
A mere restraint on alienation has nothing to do 
with 'vesting,' it relates only to the power to 
alienate the interest, and the question whether 
that interest is 'vested' or not depends on the 
contingencies that may affeet the ultimate own-
ership of the interest - contingencies which do 
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not depend on the power of alienations. The 
presence or absence of the ordinary restraint on 
alienation should therefore have no bearing on 
the applicability of the rule against perp·etuities." 
And in Note 12 under par. 280.1: 
"The Missouri cases cited in Note 10, aborve seem 
to 'be examples of this point, turning primarily 
on the form of spendthrift trust clause some-
times used in that state. The trust instruments 
in question not only expressly restrained alien-
ation but also provided that 'no right or title to 
said income or other provision for any such bene-
ficiary shall vest in him or her until the same 
shall have been actually paid into his or her 
hands.' In holding that the limitations of the 
trusts in question violated the rule ·against per-
petuities the court took this clause literally. But 
~t would seem tolerably clear that the question of 
'vesting' is a technical legal one which the se·ttlor 
cannot control i1n this way. The court's difficulty 
here seems to com.e from the use of the word 
'vest' m tw.o distinct senses, one the teclvnical 
one. relev(JJYbt to the rule against perpetu~ties, ood 
the other synonymous with r.estraimt on aliena-
tion. The restraint on 'vesting' imposed by the 
settlor did not qualify the beneficiaries' owner-
shifp of their interests; its only intend:ea; effect 
was to restrain alienation of those interests. And 
such a restraint should have no bearing on the 
application of the rule against p·erpetuities." 
This Court's opmion is. precariously perched on ·a 
narrow and reS'trictive interp·reta tion of the word "vest" 
in a spendthrift trust clause. This. word has no mysteri-
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ous po,,-er of solution in the case a.t bar. Its use and 
import has been the subject of discussion by outstanding 
authorities in the la'v of trusts. 
For exan1ple, see the introduction to Chapte,r 8, 
Cases and llfaterials on Futtttre Interests, by W. Barton 
Leech. In this introduction Professor Leech has listed 
four different llleanings of the word "vested" exrsting 
in the law of future interests: 
( 1) .. A_ n1eaning of vested in possession. 
(2) \'ested in interest, meaning that although an 
interest is still a future interest, that it is not subject to 
a condition precedent other than the determination of the 
particular estate. 
(3) \!ested in the sense that if the named taker dies 
before it becomes possessory, the interest is transmissiblH 
to his estate and that his heirs or distributees will take 
the interest he would have taken had he lived; and finally, 
(-±) The rneaning of the word "ve'St" where the Rule 
against Perpetuities is involved, an interest is vested 
when it has acquired the degree of certainty which, under 
the· rule an interest must acquire within lives and being 
and 21 years or fail. 
Certainly if the court is relying on the word "vest" 
as rneaning vest in possession, then there would never he· 
a valid gift over of a remainder in a trust because the 
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interest of the beneficiary in re·mainder in all such trusts 
does not vest in possession until after the death of the 
settlor. 
If the court is relying on the meaning of "vest" as 
distinguished from "contingent" then respondents con-
tend that the opinion is fallacious in that the interest of 
a beneficiary ran certainly be ·'contingent" without caus-
ing the trust to be testa1nentary. In assuming a situation 
w·here a trust is adnlittedly not testamentary, Professor 
Scott in 43 Hart·a.rd. Lau· Revie~v, page 524 "Trusts and 
The Statute of Wills" states: 
"At the tilne of the conveyance the beneficiary 
acquires a future interest which may he vested or 
contingent." 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED THAT 
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT MUST FAIL BECAUSE THE 
INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARIES DID NOT IMMEDI-
ATELY VEST IN POSSESSION. THE TEST THIS COURT 
SHOULD HAVE APPLIED IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF 
THE TRUST AGREEMENT IS WHETHER OR NOT SAID 
AGREEMENT BONA FIDELY TRANSFERRED A PROP-
ERTY INTEREST FROM TRUSTOR TO TRUSTEE. 
The eourt, in its opinion, has taken the "cart before 
the horse." The interest of the beneficiaries should re·-
sult from the initial determination of whether or not the 
trust is valid according to the points argued in the briefs 
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13 
on file. If it is detern1ined that the trust is valid, then 
it \Yould follo'v that the interest of the beneficiaries. are 
"yested'' if the court 'vishes to call it so. 
The test as laid do,vn by the cases and authorities on 
the subjert as to \vhether or not a trust is testamentary 
is \vhether or not there is a valid transfer of the property 
fron1 trustor to trustee. In other \vords whether the 
purported trust agree1nent is a valid deed or whether 
it is an atten1pted 'vill. The authorities uniformly hold 
that there is no policy against disposing of property by 
1nea.ns of a trust instead of a 'vill. Professor Scott sta.te1s 
at page 338, \-.-ol. 1, Scott on Trusts: 
··It is sometilnes suggested that a trust 
created inter vivos is invalid if it is made in lieu 
of a w,.ill. Such an objection is almost meaning-
less. Any trust whch is to continue after the 
death of the settlor 1nust be created either inter 
vivos or by will, and if either form of disposition 
is en1ployed it is used in lieu of the other. * * * 
It would seem, however, tha:t the disposition is 
not to he condemned merely because the settlor 
elected to dispose of his property one way rather 
than in another." 
In the present state of property law it is generally 
agreed that future interests can be conveyed. It is stated 
in 18 .Blick. L. R. page 470, "When Are Deeds Testa-
nlentary ~" by Henry W. Ballantine: 
"But in a majority of states the language 
that the deed is 'to be in force or take effect from 
and after the decease of the grantor', is inter-
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preted very liberally. * * * The probable inten-
tion is effectuate'd by holding the instrument 
operative in praesenti as a grant of future estate. 
* * * In view of the act of delivery to the grantee 
in the lifetime of the grantor, and the intention 
to be gathered from the whole transaction, the 
provision that 'title shall not pass until death,' 
does not mean that the grantee shall acquire no 
right or interest under the deed until the 
grantor's death. 'The deed conveys a vested in-
terest to commence in futuro, and necessarily 
cuts down the estate remaining in the grantor." 
And at 11 A.L.R. 36: 
"A deed may pass a present interest in 
property, the estate in which is a future one. 
One has an interest in property when he pres-
ently owns or holds some property rights therein, 
regardless of the time at which the estate comes 
_into enjoyment." 
Also, see J7enters v. Wickens (1906), 224 Ill. 569, 
79 N.E. 947, and Jones 1:. Caird (1913), 153 Wis. 384, 141 
N.W. 228. 
The ultimate question is whether the Trust Agree-
ment in question was intended as a present conveyance 
from trustor to ·trustee, or whether it was meant to be 
a will. There can be no question 'but that the trustors 
meant this to he a present conveyance and the interest 
of the beneficiaries to be a present conveyance of a future 
estate, one to take effect in enjoyment and possession at 
a future time. If the trustors had intended a Will, cer-
tainly they would have created a Will. Beside·~, 'a Will 
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is an1bulatory and revocable. This instrument was ex-
pressly n1ade reYooa.ble and dealt \Vi th specifically desig-
nated property. It is stated in the case- of Jon.es v. Ca,ird, 
supra: 
~'* * * it is a fair presumption that he in-
tended something valid and effectual, rather than 
so1nething void and useless." 
It is stated in Fonda v. j_lliller (1951), 411 Ill. 74, 
103 N.E. 2d 98: 
'"Of great importance in our thinking on this 
subject is the long uninterrupted line of cases in 
this State holding that where there is a deed 
reserving a life estate in the grantor, there is a 
strong presumption that it is intended that the 
title should vest immediately in the remainder-
man, for the reason that if such intention ha:d 
not existed there would be no reason for the res-
ervation." 
Of course, if the eourt holds that the settlor retaine1d 
so 1nuch in the transaction that he actually conveyed 
nothing to the trustee, then there would be no trust. How~ 
ever, if the court holds that the settlor created what he 
purported to create, a trust 'vith a conveyance of prop·-
erty to the trustee, then, whatever one 1nay call the inter-
est of the beneficiary is of no import. Then it is a real 
interest existing by reason of the trust an'd n1ust he trans-
ferred to 'beneficiaries as provide·d in the trust. 
The recent leading case of National Shawm.~~;t Bank 
of Boston et al. v. Joy et al., (1944), 315 Mass. 457, 53 
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N .E. 2d 113, contains a very thorough discussion of the 
law involved in the case at bar. In that case the settlor 
created an intervivos trust of corporate stocks and bonds, 
reserving a life estate in himself, plus powers to revoke, 
alter or an1end. After settlor's death, the trust provided 
for a life estate in one Sophia Brown and after her death 
the principal was to be paid over to such person or per-
sons or corporations as the donor may appoint by an 
instrument duly acknowledged and under seal and de-
posited with the trustees, and in default of such appoint-
Inent, to such persons as are entitled to settlor's property 
under intestacy laws. Settlor died without making an 
appointment. 
The decision in the case expressly overruled the 
earlier ~fassachusetts case of McE,z;oy v. Boston Five 
Cents Savings BO!Yitk, 87 N.E. 465, and held that the trust 
was valid. 
In a separate part of the opinion, the interest of the 
beneficiaries was discussed: 
"Until Nicholls died, his cousins (heirs under 
intestacy law) had not even what has been called 
a 'vested', or more properly a transmissible, inter-
est in a contingent remainder * * * which interest 
arises where, except for the possible loss of the 
property through the exercise of an underlying 
power of appointment, the remainderman cannot 
fail to take if he lives until the time of ve:sting 
* * *, in a precise use of language the interest of 
the statutory next of kin was not a 'remainder' 
but was properly described as a future inter-est 
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'in the nature of an equitable remainder.' * * • 
But in current speech it was an equitable con-
tingent remainder. * * * Even if the p·roperty had 
been realty, there would have been no need of 
tracing a fee into the settlor or his heirs while 
the contingency ren1ained undetermined, as in 
legal estates at common la'v * * *, for the fact 
that the fee would be in the trustees would have 
satisfied all the feudal requirements of the com-
mon law.*** 
"Equity has always recognized future and 
even executory * * * beneficial interests in realty 
or personalty without regard to common law tech-
nicalities, and even in favor of unascertainerd or 
unborn persons, subject however to the Rule 
against Perp·etuities * * *. A trust is valid al-
though the beneficiaries are left to he determined 
by the 'vill of the settlor. * * * The selection of 
beneficiaries out of a class may he left to the 
trustee." 
In the above cited case, the fact that the beneficiaries 
had no vested interest and were not even discernible at 
the time the trust was created, had nothing to do with 
the determination in a separate part of the opinion of 
whether the trust was real or illusory. The settlor in 
the case at bar couldn't possibly have intended to convey 
less of an interest to the· beneficiaries specifically nam·ed, 
than the settlor in the Joy case did in giving his bene-, 
ficiaries what was called not even a vested inlerest in a 
contingent remainder. 
Another interesting case is VanCott v. PrentiJce an1d 
others (1887), 104 N.Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257. In that case 
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the settlor deli¥ered securities and an instrument to the 
trustee reserving the right of revocation and directing 
said trustee to pay the income to Clarence King for the 
use of three designated beneficiaries for life and to be 
disposed of at settlor's death in accordance with sealed 
instructions also delivered at that time to the trustees. 
The trust instrument specifically provided: 
"* * * and it is hereby declared and made a 
condition of these trusts that the beneficiaries 
thereof have no legal or equitable right to the prin-
cipal or income of said securities or investments, 
but receive the same only as herein provided, as 
preceding solely from the bounty of said Prentice, 
and subject to his power to revoke the trusts here-
by created." 
Also, the trustee was to hold and manage ·the fund 
subject to the direction and control of the settlor. The 
court held that the trust was valid and not testamentary 
and stated in regard to the contention that the ahove 
provision made the trust testan1entary: 
"The latter provision is plainly but an ampli-
fication of the idea involved in the power of revo-
cation; for the grantor adds that the beneficiaries 
~hall take what they receive as proceeding from 
his bounty, and subject to his right to revoke at 
any moment. * * * We ought not to put the creator 
of the trust in the attitude of deliberately nullify-
ing his own evident purpose. That he meant to 
create an effective trust is beyond all question; 
ood a oonstruction which. makes him destroy the 
very ·effort to create should not p·revail if there 
be an;y other ration.al in.terpretation." 
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It \vas also held in the r'"an .. Cott case that the sealed 
paper "~as to be read as part of the deed and was not 
testamentary. 
In the l'" an Cott case, it can he seen that although the 
beneficiaries in ren1ainder \vere not even known until 
after settlor's death "~hen the sealed paper was opened, 
and in spite of the specific \\'Ords to the effect that such 
beneficiaries had no legal or equitable right until they 
received their shares, the obvious intent of the settlor 
''Tas carried out and these objections \Vere brushed away 
as inconsequential. 
The opinion of this Court has misconstrued both 
the Joy case and the VanCott case. 
A well known principle in trust law is th'H rule allow-
ing a beneficiary to be ascertaine·d by an act which has 
significance apart from its effect upon the aisposition 
of the trust property. This is illustrated by the following 
at p. 332, Vol. 1, Scott on Trusts: 
'' * * * as for example, where the settlor trans-
fers property in trust to p~ay income to himself 
for life and to distribute the principal among per-
sons in his employ at the time of his death." 
In this situation the beneficiary ·cannot even be as-
certained until after the death of the settlor and yet there 
seems to be no question in such a case of whether or not 
the b~neficiary has a vested interest until after the death 
of the settlor. 
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The recent Utah cas·e of Thatcher et al. v. Merrimwn 
et al., (1952), ...... Utah------, 240 P. 2d 266, dealt with a de- . 
cedent who assigned to defendants a promissory note re-
taining the right to receive all of the installments of 
principal paid on the note during assignor's lifetime. 
It was held by this Court that this constituted a present 
gift of such part of the principal as did not be-come due 
and was not paid during the lifetime of the assignor and 
therefore not invalid as a testamentary disposition. 
The above cases and authorities establish very defi-
nitely that whether the beneficiaries' in ter·est is deemed 
vested, contingent, or called any other name iis not con-
trolling in determining whether th·e trust in question is 
real or illusory. This question should be decided by de-
tennining whether or not there was a real transfer of 
property fron1 trustor to trustee. If there was such a 
transfer then the interest of the beneficiaries will aC-
cordingly be determined to be a real interest and not a 
mere expectancy, whether it be deemed vested or contin-
gent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is repectfully submitted that respondents should 
be granted a rehearing for the following reasons: 
(1) Respond'ents have had no opportunity to argue 
before this Court the novel and unprecedented theory 
upon which this Court's opinion was based. 
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(2) Thi~ Court 1nisconstrued the intent. of the two 
· settlors \Yhieh is 1nanifested time and again throughout 
the trust docu1nent, by taking out of context and meaning 
fron1 the ~pendthrift clause the \Yords "shall in no case 
vest''. There is a specific intent to create real interests 
in the beneficiaries expressed .even in the spendthrift 
clause itself. Further1nore, the word ~'vest" in a spend-
thrift clause has a n1eaning connected with restraint on 
alienation and has no significance with respect to crea-
tion of a property interest. 
(3) This Court has attempted to solve the. p~roblem 
of \Yhether the purported trust is real or illusory 'by falla-
ciously reasoning from effect to cause. The correct test 
should be to determine whether the transaction in ques-
tion \\"as real or illusory. The determination of this ques-
tion will decide ·w··hether or not the beneficiaries have an 
interest in the property in question. 
This Court's opinion is based on a narrow construc-
tion which has defeated the intent of the two settlors 
to dispose of their property in such a way that their heirs 
could eventually have it after the de·ath of the survivor. 
The evolution of property law has been away from the 
strict, the technical, and the narrow, toward liberally at-
tenlpting to allow persons to dispose of their property 
as they see fit. 
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This Court, by narrowly and strictly interp·reting 
the trust instrument, has thwarted the intent of two 
elderly people to bestow upon their own descendants the 
bounty of their joint life's effort. It is our sincere hope 
that this ·Court will not allow such a gross mis·carriage. 
of justice to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorney for Respo'J'«l,ents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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